While we were video-chatting this morning, my brother asked me what the sense was in Israel of when, what and whether America (and Israel(?)) would attack Iran. I replied that no opinion was worth the ether it was written on. Political commentators are only going through the motions of analysing Trump’s comments and actions because they are afraid that, if they admitted that they have no better idea than anyone else what he will do next, they would be talking themselves out of a job.
There is a sense in which we are all waiting for something to happen, and kind of wishing it would happen already, so that we could drink all the bottled water we have bought, stop wondering whether we should be sleeping fully clothed, and get on with our lives. There is certainly no atmosphere of panic buying or changing plans. Bernice’s brother and his wife even came for a short visit from England, recognising that if they wait until it is ‘safe’ to come they may never make it. Their only concession to the situation was to fly El Al rather than their usual BA. We had a lovely couple of days with them, and by the time you read this, they should be safely on their way back home.
Speaking personally, I must confess to not feeling particularly, and probably not sufficiently, worried about the external threat from Iran, or, indeed, anywhere else. I am convinced that Israel’s real existential threats are internal. I don’t pretend that this is an original thought. Indeed, I would say that it is now part of the national mood.
In 2025, for the first time since Israel’s founding in 1948, the rate of population growth fell below 1%. There are several reasons for this. First, it is a consequence of Israel’s age structure: large age cohorts of Jews and Arabs have begun entering their 70s and 80s, and life expectancy in Israel is about 83.
Secondly, fertility rates are declining in all sectors: most steeply in the Arab sector, but even in the Haredi (ultra-orthodox Jewish) sector.
Finally, there has been a sharp shift in Israel’s migration patterns since 2023. In 2024, the number of immigrants entering Israel minus the number leaving turned negative, reaching -26,000. This trend continued in 2025, and is continuing in 2026, and has no precedent in the country’s history. While this mainly reflects the remigration of non-native Israelis (including many who are culturally but not halachically Jewish), it also includes increasing numbers of native Israelis.
Many of those choosing to leave wish to escape, and to take their children away from, a war zone. Months after the announcement of the ceasefire, there is no sense that the country is at peace, and parents of young children particularly are disturbed by the fact that their families are only too familiar with the drill for getting to a safe room or public shelter within the allotted time.
Others wish to escape the other stresses of life in Israel: the sectarian political squabbles; the refusal of the Haredi world to see itself as part of Israeli society in terms of military or civil service or the economy, and the clashes this refusal generates; the violence in the Arab sector and the unwillingness or inability of the Israeli civil authorities to deal with it; the burden of military reserve duty, the rise in the cost of living, the shortage of affordable housing, and so on and so on.
More and more Israelis are finding the strain of day-to-day living at this level of intensity unbearable, and are looking to escape to a simpler, quieter life abroad. Fewer than usual are looking to the US and the West, and more are looking to more remote locations in Europe and the Far East.
At the same time, other Israelis are looking at the stresses and faultlines in Israeli society and asking how the threats these pose can be met. I have only recently learnt in detail about one such group, and I thought today I would share with you the vision they are currently refining. The group is called The Fourth Quarter, reflecting the theory that young countries typically face existential challenges in the fourth quarter of their first century. This is certainly proving true of Israel, which turned 75 last May.
The Fourth Quarter is honing an Israeli Contract, designed to reflect a broad consensus on the most important challenges facing Israel. Let me present those challenges, and the proposed method for achieving common purpose to meet them.
Education
One education system with different streams.
There should be one common national education council, and a council for each stream. 50% of studies should be core curriculum, common to all streams. There should be a set budget for each child, and not differential budgets for different streams. In addition, preference needs to be given to fully national-Haredi schools, which will put an end to discrimination against Haredi pupils: every pupil is entitled to a state education. Local authorities will be compelled to set up such schools, and budgets and buildings will be made available for these schools.
Security and a Strong Army
We need a strong army and compulsory service. Currently 50% of the cohort do not enlist. The army is lacking 12,000 troops.
There should be no automatic exemption. Everyone should be required to report to the recruiting office, where priority will be given to the needs of the army. Civilian national service will be compulsory for Arabs. All those who serve will receive benefits, commensurate with their service: reductions in fees, help with childcare and housing. Exemption (at a rate of 5% of the total cohort) will be granted to the elite (in sport, music, Torah study, etc.)
The Torah World
The state should take responsibility for the Torah world. Yeshiva high schools should offer tailor-made tracks for military service. Decisions on exemption from military service should be made by the state and not by the yeshivas.
The Economy
Torah alongside work. An end to subsidising those who choose not to work. Maximising one’s earning capability should be a condition for receiving allowances and discounts. The status of ‘Yeshiva student’ should be time-limited (just like the status of ‘Student’). There should be a limited number of positions for Torah students (as there are for academics). The allocation of coalition funds (awarded to Government parties) should be restricted; it should be forbidden to award them to a particular sector only.
Law Enforcement and Governance
Governance: An end to Autonomy Outside the Law.
An emergency unit should be set up in the Prime Minister’s office to fight organized crime. An authority should be set up to oversee NGOs. The powers of private Haredi courts should be reduced.
The Keys to Lifelong Citizenship
Everyone should be aware, from a young age, that everyone serves: that is the default. A flag in every school should be a condition for state funding. Studies in Israeli history and civics should be a condition for schools receiving state funding. Everyone should receive their ID card in an official state ceremony. A high IDF enlistment rate should be a condition for a yeshiva receiving state funding. Citizens should apply directly to state institutions to receive services, not through agents.
I have presented the Fourth Quarter’s proposal in such detail both because I believe it identifies accurately so many of the pain points in Israeli society and also because I find it impossible to disagree with its proposed solutions.
Of course, the key question is: How do we get from here to there? It seems to me that the only answer is: By electing to the Knesset a new generation of politicians that are committed to effecting this kind of social change. In order to do that, we need to have leaders of that new generation who are willing to stand for election. The last two-and-a-half years have shown that suitable candidates exist. The aftermath of October 7 threw up an amazing number of social activists who displayed, and continue to display, the vision, the organisational skills, the empathy and the sheer energy we look for in a politician. What is less clear is how many of these leaders are prepared to enter the cesspit of Israeli politics.
What seems clear is that, until we eradicate the no-longer-sustainable mass exemption of Haredim from service and subsidisation of their exemption from the workforce, and until we address the inequalities and sense of abandonment by or dissociation from mainstream Israeli society felt by many in the Haredi, Arab and other sectors of Israeli society, the country will be unable to move forward from its current crises. Until political parties free themselves from the perceived need to buy Haredi parties’ support in a coalition, there is no way to move forward. However, if a political party emerges from the endeavours of The Fourth Quarter, then, at some point in the future, Israel may be able to start reshaping its social fabric to move towards its 100th anniversary with renewed strength and confidence and a more united vision. The alternative may chillingly but realistically be that Israel will not reach its 100th anniversary, and that is a prospect that I don’t want to contemplate.
You can learn more about The Fourth Quarter (in English) here, and you can respond to the survey they are conducting to help refine the Israeli contract (in Hebrew only, as far as I can see) here.